In the claims:

This listing of claims will replace all prior versions and listings of claims in the application:

1. (currently amended) [[The]] \underline{A} method for mutual authentication of a first station and a second station, comprising:

encrypting providing a particular data random key at the first station, disassembling and by first veiling the particular data random key [[using]] by forming a first conversion array seeded by a shared secret and then encrypting the first conversion array veiled particular data random key to produce a first encrypted data set [[key]], where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;

sending a first message to the second station including the first encrypted <u>data set</u> [[key]], where the second station decrypts <u>first encrypted data set</u> and unveils <u>and reassembles</u> said particular data random key using the shared secret, and where the second station <u>disassembles</u> and <u>veils encrypts</u> the <u>particular data random key by first veiling</u> a version of the particular data random key [[using]] <u>by forming</u> a second conversion array seeded by the shared secret and then <u>encrypting encrypts</u> the <u>veiled second conversion array version of the particular data random key to produce a second encrypted key, and sends a second message to the first station carrying the second encrypted <u>data set</u> [[key]], where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station; [[and]]</u>

receiving the second message, and decrypting the second encrypted data set, and reassembling and unveiling the version of the particular data random key at the first station; and determining at the first station if the version of the particular data random key matches an expected version the particular data random key, and if so providing an additional particular data random key at the first station, disassembling and veiling the additional particular data random key by forming a third conversion array seeded by an additional shared secret and then encrypting the third conversion array to produce a first additional encrypted data set, where access to the additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;

sending a third message to the second station including the first additional encrypted data set, where the second station decrypts the first additional encrypted data set and reassembles and unveils said additional particular data random key using the additional shared secret, and where

28	the second station disassembles and veils a version of the additional particular data random key
29	by forming a fourth conversion array seeded by the additional shared secret and then encrypts the
30	fourth conversion array to produce a second additional encrypted data set, and sends a fourth
31	message to the first station carrying the second additional encrypted data set, where access to the
32	additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station; and
33	receiving the fourth message, and decrypting the second additional encrypted data set and
34	reassembling and unveiling the version of the additional particular data random key at the first
35	station, and
36	determining at the first station if the version of the additional data random key matches
37	an expected version the additional data random key, and if so continuing with further exchanges
38	of messages with the second station.

- 1 2. (canceled).
- 3. (currently amended) The method of claim $\underline{1}$ [[2]], wherein said additional particular data
- 2 random key is the same as the particular data random key.
- 4. (currently amended) The method of claim 1, where the one of the first and second conversion
- 2 arrays comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, and
- 3 including instructions
- 4 generating one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number
- 5 generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values
- 6 corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
- 7 Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions, and
- 8 placing a byte of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Y byte
- 9 positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.
- 5. (withdrawn) The method of claim 1, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays
- 2 comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Z bit positions in an order, and including
- 3 generating one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number
- 4 generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values

- 5 corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
- 6 Z and identifying one of said Z bit positions, and
- 7 placing a bit of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Z bit
- 8 positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.
- 6. (withdrawn) The method of claim 1, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays
- 2 comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, each of said
- 3 Y byte positions including B bit positions in an order, and including
- 4 generating one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number
- 5 generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a first pseudorandom number having X values
- 6 corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
- 7 Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions,
- 8 using a random number generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a second
- 9 pseudorandom number having B values corresponding with respective bits in a byte of said
- random key, the B values each being between 1 and B and identifying one of said B bit positions,
- placing a byte, including B bits, of said random key in each of said X sections at the one
- of said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values, and
- mapping the B bits of said byte of said random key to said B bit positions identified by
- the corresponding one of said B values.
- 7. (withdrawn) The method of claim 1, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays
- 2 comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, each of said
- 3 Y byte positions including B bit positions in an order, and including
- 4 generating one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number
- 5 generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a first pseudorandom number having X values
- 6 corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
- 7 Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions,
- 8 using a random number generator to produce a second pseudorandom number having B
- 9 values corresponding with respective bits in a byte of said random key, the B values each being
- between 1 and B and identifying one of said B bit positions,

11	placing a byte, including B bits, of said random key in each of said X sections at the one
12	of said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values, and
13	mapping the B bits of said byte of said random key to said B bit positions identified by

the corresponding one of said B values.

- 8. (currently amended) The method of claim 1, including presenting a [[use]] user interface to
- 2 the second station from the first station carrying parameters of said first and second conversion
- 3 arrays.

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- 9. (original) The method of claim 1, including executing an interactive exchange of messages to
- 2 deliver the particular data random key from the first station to the second station.
- 1 10. (currently amended) A data processing apparatus, comprising:
 - a processor, a communication interface adapted for connection to a communication medium, and memory storing instructions for execution by the data processor, the instructions including
 - logic to encrypt provide a particular data random key at the first station and to disassemble and veil by first veiling the particular data random key [[using]] by forming a first conversion array seeded by a shared secret and then to encrypt the first conversion array veiled particular data random key to produce a first encrypted data set key, where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;

logic to send a first message to the second station including the first encrypted <u>data set</u> [[key]], where the second station decrypts and unveils <u>the first encrypted data set</u> <u>said particular</u> <u>data random key</u> using the shared secret, and where the second station <u>encrypts the particular</u> <u>data random key by first veiling disassembles and veils</u> a version of the particular data random key <u>using by forming</u> a second conversion array seeded by the shared secret and then <u>to encrypt encrypting</u> the <u>veiled version of the particular data random key second conversion array</u> to produce a second encrypted <u>data set</u> [[key]], and sends a second message to the first station carrying the second encrypted <u>data set</u> [[key]], where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station; [[and]]

19	logic to receive the second message, and to decrypt and unveil the version of the				
20	particular data random key at the first station; and				
21	logic to determine at the first station if the version of the particular data random key				
22	matches an expected version the particular data random key, and if so provide an additional				
23	particular data random key at the first station, disassemble and veil the additional particular data				
24	random key by forming a third conversion array seeded by an additional shared secret and then				
25	to encrypt the third conversion array to produce a first additional encrypted data set, where				
26	access to the additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;				
27	logic to send a third message to the second station including the first additional encrypted				
28	data set, where the second station decrypts the first additional encrypted data set and reassembles				
29	and unveils the additional particular data random key using the additional shared secret, and				
30	where the second station disassembles and veils a version of the additional particular data				
31	random key by forming a fourth conversion array seeded by the additional shared secret and then				
32	encrypts the fourth conversion array to produce a second additional encrypted data set, and sends				
33	a fourth message to the first station carrying the second additional encrypted data set, where				
34	access to the additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station;				
35	logic to receive the fourth message, and decrypt the second additional encrypted data set				
36	and to reassemble and unveil the version of the additional particular data random key at the first				
37	station; and				
38	logic to determine at the first station if the version of the additional data random key				
39	matches an expected version the additional data random key, and if so to continue with further				
40	exchanges of messages with the second station.				
1	11. (canceled).				
1	12. (currently amended) The apparatus of claim 10 [[11]], wherein said additional particular data				
2	random key is the same as the particular data random key.				
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1	13. (original) The apparatus of claim 10, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays				
2	comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, and				
3	including logic to				

4	generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
5	seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values corresponding
6	with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and Y and
7	identifying one of said Y byte positions, and
8	to place a byte of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Y byte
9	positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.
1	14. (withdrawn) The apparatus of claim 10, where the one of the first and second conversion
2	arrays comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Z bit positions in an order, and
3	including logic to
4	generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
5	seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values corresponding
6	with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and Z and
7	identifying one of said Z bit positions, and
8	to place a bit of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Z bit
9	positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.
1	15. (withdrawn) The apparatus of claim 10, where the one of the first and second conversion
2	arrays comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, each
3	of said Y byte positions including B bit positions in an order, and including logic to
4	generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
5	seeded by said shared secret to produce a first pseudorandom number having X values
6	corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
7	Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions,
8	use a random number generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a second
9	pseudorandom number having B values corresponding with respective bits in a byte of said
10	random key, the B values each being between 1 and B and identifying one of said B bit positions,
11	place a byte, including B bits, of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of
12	said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values, and
13	map the B bits of said byte of said random key to said B bit positions identified by the
14	corresponding one of said B values.

1	16.	(withdrawn)) The apparatus	of claim 10	, where the on	e of the first and	d second conversion

- arrays comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, each
- 3 of said Y byte positions including B bit positions in an order, and including logic to
- 4 generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
- 5 seeded by said shared secret to produce a first pseudorandom number having X values
- 6 corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
- 7 Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions,
- 8 use a random number generator to produce a second pseudorandom number having B
- 9 values corresponding with respective bits in a byte of said random key, the B values each being
- between 1 and B and identifying one of said B bit positions,
- place a byte, including B bits, of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of
- said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values, and
- map the B bits of said byte of said random key to said B bit positions identified by the
- 14 corresponding one of said B values.
- 1 17. (original) The apparatus of claim 10, including logic to present a user interface to the second
- 2 station from the first station carrying parameters of said first and second conversion arrays.
- 1 18. (original) The apparatus of claim 10, including logic to execute an interactive exchange of
- 2 messages to deliver the particular data random key from the first station to the second station.
- 1 19. (currently amended) An article, comprising:
- 2 machine readable data storage medium having computer program instructions stored
- 3 therein for establishing a communication session on a communication medium between a first
- 4 data processing station and a second data processing station having access to the communication
- 5 medium, said instructions comprising
- 6 logic to encrypt provide a particular data random key at the first station and to
- 7 <u>disassemble and veil by first veiling</u> the particular data random key using by forming a first
- 8 conversion array seeded by a shared secret and then to encrypt the first conversion array veiled
- 9 particular data random key to produce a first encrypted data set [[key]], where access to the
- shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;

logic to send a first message to the second station including the first encrypted data set
key, where the second station decrypts and unveils the first encrypted data set said particular data
random key using the shared secret, and where the second station encrypts the particular data
random key by first veiling disassembles and veils a version of the particular data random key
using by forming a second conversion array seeded by the shared secret and then to encrypt
encrypting the veiled version of the particular data random key second conversion array to
produce a second encrypted data set [[key]], and sends a second message to the first station
carrying the second encrypted data set [[key]], where access to the shared secret indicates
authenticity of the second station; [[and]]
logic to receive the second message, and to decrypt and unveil the version of the
particular data random key at the first station; and
logic to determine at the first station if the version of the particular data random key
matches an expected version the particular data random key, and if so provide an additional
particular data random key at the first station, disassemble and veil the additional particular data
random key by forming a third conversion array seeded by an additional shared secret and then
to encrypt the third conversion array to produce a first additional encrypted data set, where
access to the additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;
logic to send a third message to the second station including the first additional encrypted
data set, where the second station decrypts the first additional encrypted data set and reassembles
and unveils the additional particular data random key using the additional shared secret, and
where the second station disassembles and veils a version of the additional particular data
random key by forming a fourth conversion array seeded by the additional shared secret and then
encrypts the fourth conversion array to produce a second additional encrypted data set, and sends
a fourth message to the first station carrying the second additional encrypted data set, where
access to the additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station;
logic to receive the fourth message, and decrypt the second additional encrypted data set
and to reassemble and unveil the version of the additional particular data random key at the first
station; and
logic to determine at the first station if the version of the additional data random key
matches an expected version the additional data random key, and if so to continue with further
exchanges of messages with the second station

- 1 20. (canceled).
- 1 21. (original) The article of claim 19, wherein said additional particular data random key is the
- 2 same as the particular data random key.
- 1 22. (original) The article of claim 19, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays
- 2 comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, and the
- 3 instructions include logic to
- 4 generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
- 5 seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values corresponding
- 6 with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and Y and
- 7 identifying one of said Y byte positions, and
- 8 to place a byte of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Y byte
- 9 positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.
- 1 23. (withdrawn) The article of claim 19, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays
- 2 comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Z bit positions in an order, and the
- 3 instructions include logic to
- 4 generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
- 5 seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values corresponding
- 6 with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and Z and
- 7 identifying one of said Z bit positions, and
- 8 to place a bit of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Z bit
- 9 positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.
- 1 24. (withdrawn) The article of claim 19, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays
- 2 comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, each of said
- 3 Y byte positions including B bit positions in an order, and the instructions include logic to
- 4 generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
- 5 seeded by said shared secret to produce a first pseudorandom number having X values

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6	corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
7	Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions,
8	use a random number generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a second

pseudorandom number having B values corresponding with respective bits in a byte of said random key, the B values each being between 1 and B and identifying one of said B bit positions,

place a byte, including B bits, of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values, and

map the B bits of said byte of said random key to said B bit positions identified by the corresponding one of said B values.

- 25. (withdrawn) The article of claim 19, where the one of the first and second conversion arrays
- 2 comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, each of said
- 3 Y byte positions including B bit positions in an order, and the instructions include logic to
- 4 generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator
- 5 seeded by said shared secret to produce a first pseudorandom number having X values
- 6 corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
- 7 Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions,
- 8 use a random number generator to produce a second pseudorandom number having B
- 9 values corresponding with respective bits in a byte of said random key, the B values each being
- 10 between 1 and B and identifying one of said B bit positions,
- place a byte, including B bits, of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of
- said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values, and
- map the B bits of said byte of said random key to said B bit positions identified by the
- 14 corresponding one of said B values.
- 1 26. (original) The article of claim 19, wherein the instructions include logic to present a user
- 2 interface to the second station from the first station carrying parameters of said first and second
- 3 conversion arrays.

- 1 27. (original) The article of claim 19, wherein the instructions include logic to execute an
- 2 interactive exchange of messages to deliver the particular data random key from the first station
- 3 to the second station.
- 1 28. (new) A method for mutual authentication of a first station and a second station, comprising:
- 2 providing a particular data random key at the first station, disassembling and veiling the
- 3 particular data random key by forming a first conversion array seeded by a shared secret and then
- 4 encrypting the first conversion array to produce a first encrypted data set, where access to the
- 5 shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;
- sending a first message to the second station including the first encrypted data set key,
- 7 where the second station decrypts first encrypted data set and unveils and reassembles said
- 8 particular data random key using the shared secret, and where the second station disassembles
- 9 and veils a version of the particular data random key by forming a second conversion array
- seeded by the shared secret and then encrypts the second conversion array to produce a second
- encrypted key, and sends a second message to the first station carrying the second encrypted data
- set, where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station;
- receiving the second message, and decrypting the second encrypted data set, and
- reassembling and unveiling the version of the particular data random key at the first station; and
- determining at the first station if the version of the particular data random key matches an
- 16 expected version the particular data random key, and if so continuing with further exchanges of
- messages with the second station;
- where the one of the first and second conversion arrays comprises X sections, each of
- said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, and including
- 20 generating one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number
- 21 generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values
- corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and
- 23 Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions, and
- placing a byte of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Y byte
- 25 positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.

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- 79 <i>1</i>	newl	A	data	nrocessing	annaratus	comprising:
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a processor, a communication interface adapted for connection to a communication medium, and memory storing instructions for execution by the data processor, the instructions including

logic to provide a particular data random key at the first station and to disassemble and veil the particular data random key by forming a first conversion array seeded by a shared secret and then to encrypt the first conversion array to produce a first encrypted data set, where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;

logic to send a first message to the second station including the first encrypted data set key, where the second station decrypts and unveils the first encrypted data set using the shared secret, and where the second station disassembles and veils a version of the particular data random key by forming a second conversion array seeded by the shared secret and then to encrypt the second conversion array to produce a second encrypted data set, and sends a second message to the first station carrying the second encrypted data set, where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station;

logic to receive the second message, and to decrypt and unveil the version of the particular data random key at the first station; and

logic to determine at the first station if the version of the particular data random key matches an expected version the particular data random key, and if so to continue with further exchanges of messages with the second station;

where the one of the first and second conversion arrays comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, and including logic to

generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions, and

to place a byte of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.

30. (new) An article, comprising:

machine readable data storage medium having computer program instructions stored therein for establishing a communication session on a communication medium between a first data processing station and a second data processing station having access to the communication medium, said instructions comprising

logic to provide a particular data random key at the first station and to disassemble and veil the particular data random key by forming a first conversion array seeded by a shared secret and then to encrypt the first conversion array to produce a first encrypted data set, where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;

logic to send a first message to the second station including the first encrypted data set key, where the second station decrypts and unveils the first encrypted data set using the shared secret, and where the second station disassembles and veils a version of the particular data random key by forming a second conversion array seeded by the shared secret and then to encrypt the second conversion array to produce a second encrypted data set, and sends a second message to the first station carrying the second encrypted data set, where access to the shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station;

logic to receive the second message, and to decrypt and unveil the version of the particular data random key at the first station; and

logic to determine at the first station if the version of the particular data random key matches an expected version the particular data random key, and if so to continue with further exchanges of messages with the second station;

where the one of the first and second conversion arrays comprises X sections, each of said X sections including Y byte positions in an order, and the instructions include logic to

generate one of the first and second conversion arrays using a random number generator seeded by said shared secret to produce a pseudorandom number having X values corresponding with respective sections of said X sections, the X values each being between 1 and Y and identifying one of said Y byte positions, and

to place a byte of said random key in each of said X sections at the one of said Y byte positions identified by the corresponding one of said X values.

1 31. (new) A method for mutual authentication of a first station and a second station, comprising: 2 providing a particular data random key at the first station, disassembling and veiling the 3 particular data random key by forming a first conversion array seeded by a shared secret and then encrypting the first conversion array to produce a first encrypted data set key, where access to 4 5 the shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station; 6 sending a first message to the second station including the first encrypted data set, where 7 the second station decrypts first encrypted data set and unveils and reassembles said particular 8 data random key using the shared secret; 9 receiving the first message at the second station and decrypting the first encrypted data 10 set, and reassembling and unveiling the particular data random key at the second station; and 11 determining at the second station if the particular data random key matches an expected 12 version the particular data random key, and if so and disassembling and veiling a version of the 13 particular data random key by forming a second conversion array seeded by the shared secret and 14 then encrypting the second conversion array to produce a second encrypted key, and sending a 15 second message to the first station carrying the second encrypted data set, where access to the 16 shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station; 17 receiving the second message at the first station, and decrypting the second encrypted 18 data set, and reassembling and unveiling the version of the particular data random key at the first 19 station; and 20 determining at the first station if the version of the particular data random key matches an expected version the particular data random key, and if so providing an additional particular data 21 22

expected version the particular data random key, and if so providing an additional particular data random key at the first station, disassembling and veiling the additional particular data random key by forming a third conversion array seeded by an additional shared secret and then encrypting the third conversion array to produce a first additional encrypted data set, where access to the additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the first station;

sending a third message to the second station including the first additional encrypted data set;

receiving the third message at the second station and decrypting the first additional encrypted data set and unveiling and reassembling the additional particular data random key using the additional shared secret, and determining at the second station if the additional particular data random key matches an expected version the additional particular data random

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key, and if so disassembling and veiling a version of the additional particular data random key by
forming a fourth conversion array seeded by the additional shared secret and then encrypting the
fourth conversion array to produce a second additional encrypted data set;

sending a fourth message to the first station carrying the second additional encrypted data set, where access to the additional shared secret indicates authenticity of the second station;

receiving the fourth message, and decrypting the second additional encrypted data set and unveiling and reassembling the version of the additional particular data random key at the first station; and

determining at the first station if the version of the additional data random key matches an expected version the additional data random key, and if so continuing with further exchanges of messages with the second station.

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